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Abstract
Political scientists have developed several theories to explain how the United States
Congress organizes its committees. According to the informational theory, members of Congress
view committees as the most efficient way to divide the labor associated with processing a broad
range of bills. Since it would be impossible for each individual member to have expertise in
every policy area, information-gathering responsibility is distributed among the different
Members through the committee system. Committees provide information about policy
outcomes and produce legislation preferred by a majority of Members. According to the partisan
model, on the other hand, committees are organized primarily to support the political agenda of
the majority party. My study tests the extent to which these two theories explain committee
organization in the Virginia General Assembly. I put forth and test several hypotheses based on
the predictions of these two theories, using data on the occupational backgrounds, party
affiliation, and ideological preferences of General Assembly members. I find that both
informational and partisan theory apply in the General Assembly. Differences in organization
between committees can be explained by chamber rules, policy types, and the size of the party
majority. A House rule requiring proportional representation on committees has resulted in a
more informational model for the House. In the Senate, which has no such rule, committees
conform more to the expectations of the partisan theory. Committees that control important
issues like business and government spending tend to be organized more along the lines of the
partisan model, whereas committees with specialized jurisdictions in areas like agriculture and
transportation follow a more informational model. Committees that control important but
specialized issues like the legal system show a mix of partisan and informational characteristics.
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Introduction and Research Question
Over the past three decades, the Virginia General Assembly has transitioned from a
century of unified Democratic control to an era of increasing electoral competition and split
governance. After a century of Democratic majorities, the House of Delegates spent almost two
decades as a Republican stronghold before a Democratic takeover in 2020. The Virginia Senate
has proved more competitive in the twenty-first century, with some years of unified Republican
control between the House and Senate and some years when Republican majorities in the House
were countered by Democratic majorities in the Senate. The swearing-in of the first female
Speaker of the House of Delegates in 2020 signals that change for the General Assembly may
not yet be over. As the legislature continues through this new chapter of its four hundred year
history, it is important to understand the institutional practices that undergird the General
Assembly’s work, particularly as it relates to the organization of committees—the “heart of the
legislative process” (Finch, Maddrea, and Garrett 2012, 66).
Two primary modes of explaining congressional committee organization come from the
work of Keith Krehbiel (1991) and Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins (1993). According to
these scholars’ respective theories, committees attempt to produce policy in line with either the
preferences of the chamber as a whole (informational theory) or the preferences of the majority
party (partisan theory). With a few exceptions (Battista 2006), applications of these theories in
the literature have largely occurred within the context of the U.S. Congress or in cross-state
comparisons, rather than within specific states. My research determines the extent to which
informational and partisan theory explain committee organization in the Virginia General
Assembly.
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Based on each theory, I develop hypotheses that predict committee makeup in terms of
members’ occupational background, partisan affiliation, and ideological preferences. I find that
the House and Senate exhibit characteristics of both the informational and partisan models.
However, partisan theory explains committee organization in the Senate more so than in the
House, whose rules restrain the majority party from disproportionately assigning its own
members to committees. In addition to differences between chambers, the applicability of
informational and partisan theories also varies by committee and by session. Committees that
control important issues like business and government spending tend to follow a more partisan
model, while committees with specialized jurisdictions in areas like agriculture and
transportation follow a more informational model. Committees like Courts of Justice, which
control important but specialized issues, show a mix of partisan and informational
characteristics. Moreover, the analysis produced some evidence that partisan organization is
more prevalent during when the majority controls the chamber by a narrow margin.
Theoretical Background
For most of the twentieth century, studies of legislative committees were dominated by
distributional theory, which theorizes committees as groups of homogenous, high-demanding
legislators who use logrolling to pass bills which may be adverse to majority interests. In the
1990s, Krehbiel (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) challenged the distributional consensus
with alternative models for committee organization. Their respective informational and partisan
theories have since become foundational to studies of legislative organization, initially in the
United States House of Representatives but later extending to state legislatures.
Krehbiel’s book Information and Legislative Organization argues that the distributional
model fails to account for the importance of informational concerns in legislative organization.

5
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Based on the assumption that legislatures seek to acquire the greatest possible knowledge
regarding policy outcomes, Krehbiel proposes an informational framework in which legislatures
are organized to maximize the degree to which the actual outcomes of a particular policy align
with those preferred by the majority of legislators. To that end, legislatures attempt “to capture
gains from specialization” (5) by assigning committee members who, through seniority or
personal and legislative experience, will have the most knowledge about policy in the
committee’s jurisdiction. At the same time, legislatures try to create committees that will
produce legislation in line with the preferences of median legislators. Krehbiel uses game theory
models to develop empirical expectations about how distributive and informational theories
would play out through assignment and composition of committees, the use of restrictive rules,
and the procedural enforcement of logrolling deals. He then compares these expectations with
data from legislative sessions in the U.S. House of Representatives. Krehbiel concludes that the
House rarely creates committees of homogenous high-demanders, as the distributional theory
would have predicted. Exceptions to this trend mostly occur when high-demanders can offer
low-cost specialization in a particular policy area, offsetting the desire for majority-preferred
policy with informational capacity. Krehbiel also produces evidence that special rules and postfloor procedures are not used to facilitate gains from trade, suggesting that the House does not
operate in a fashion consistent with a distributive mode of organization. Importantly, Krehbiel
argues that committees, as informational bodies, serve as ideological reflections of the chamber
and produce policies amenable to the median legislator.
Cox and McCubbins, in Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, instead
contend that committees serve the interests of the majority party. Their partisan or cartel theory
holds that individual legislators in the majority party see their electoral success as more closely
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tied to the party’s actions than to the legislature’s. Therefore, both the legislators and the
committees which they control take actions which will support the preferences of the majority
party, rather than simply supplying the floor with information about policy outcomes. Cox and
McCubbins further support the cartel theory by pointing out the procedural mechanisms that
grant majority party leadership in the House of Representatives control over committee
organization, encouraging committee outcomes supported by the majority party. These
mechanisms include discretion in assigning committee members and chairs, allotting committee
tasks and resources, and scheduling hearings for committee bills on the floor. The final
consequence of such control is that “[most] bills reported from committee are sponsored by
members of the majority party and come to the floor with the support of almost all the majority
party’s committee contingent” (244), a reflection of tight party control inducing party-friendly
outcomes at the committee level. Once on the floor, Cox and McCubbins find that “noncommittee Democrats agreed with the decisions of most committees most of the time,” and
certainly supported committee decisions more than did non-committee Republicans (245). Cox
and McCubbins use these findings to support their thesis: that committees do not act as
autonomous agents within the legislature, but rather are firmly bound by the goals and aims of
the majority party.
Whereas Krehbiel, Cox, and McCubbins restrict their research to the U.S. House of
Representatives, other scholars have applied informational and partisan theories of committee
organization to the legislatures meeting in state houses across America. Overby and Kazee
(2000) demonstrate that these models can and should be applied to state legislatures. Their
analysis of twelve state lower chambers shows that state legislatures rarely form outlying
committees, either in terms of alignment between committee members and the floor or between

7
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committee party delegation and party caucus. Similarly, taking a larger sample size, Prince and
Overby (2005) interpret the rareness of preference outliers among state committees as supporting
the informational theory. However, they also point out that the relatively greater “evidence of
outliers among party delegations on committees provides some support for the party-dominant
theory” (68, emphasis added), noting that majority parties might appoint more extreme members
to certain committees to counter minority delegations. Thus, it is possible that both informational
and partisan theories may apply in either chamber of the General Assembly.
Further research has built upon the foundation laid down by this early scholarship,
providing more evidence of both informational and partisan organization in state legislatures. In
support of informational theory, some researchers have pointed to the correlation between policy
complexity and committee autonomy (Martorano 2006) or the overrepresentation of members
with prior knowledge, experience, and expertise on certain policy committees (Hamm et al.
2011). These studies could indicate that legislatures primarily rely on their committees to
efficiently gather information on policy outcomes. Other scholars have focused on partisan
theory, demonstrating that committees more often act at the behest of the party when they can
exercise greater negative agenda control, or when party leadership’s committee appointment
decisions are not subject to the approval of the full chamber (Anzia and Jackman 2013, Jackman
2013, Anderson et al. 2016). Majority size can also impact both the autonomy of committees
relative to party leadership (Francis 1989) and the extent to which committee membership is
reflective of the chamber’s ideological makeup. Some studies have found that narrow majorities
produce more committees which are more ideologically reflective of the chamber (Aldrich and
Batista 2002, Battista 2009), while other studies have found that majorities—and narrow
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majorities in particular—produce committees whose members’ ideological preferences do not
reflect those of the chamber (Hedlund et al. 2009, McGrath and Ryan 2019).1
My research will explore how well the informational and partisan models explain
committee organization in the House and Senate of the Virginia General Assembly. No study has
attempted to test legislative organization theories in the General Assembly, as Battista (2006)
does for the California state legislature. Do committees of the Virginia General Assembly seek
primarily to serve and reflect the interests of their parent chambers? Or, do they serve as agents
of the majority party, preventing bills which the party leadership dislikes from making it to the
floor and advancing those which the leadership likes? In addition to analyzing the relevance of
the informational and partisan theories to the General Assembly, I will compare the Senate and
House committee systems. I develop hypotheses to test the informational and partisan models in
both the House and Senate and test them with data provided by the Virginia Public Access
Project, Virginia’s Legislative Information System, and the American Legislatures project.
General Assembly Background
The Virginia General Assembly, like most state legislatures, is bicameral, with a lower
chamber of one hundred members (the House of Delegates, or House) and an upper chamber of
forty members (the Senate). Delegates, each of whom represents approximately 80,000 Virginia

1

David Rohde’s (1991) theory of conditional party government specifies the role of party in committee organization
and legislative outcomes. Under this theory, the majority party leadership’s power to use committees in advancing a
partisan agenda depends on the degree of party unity; more homogenous parties delegate more power to party
leadership, who in turn serve the collective electoral goals of the party. Empowered leadership appoints committee
delegations representative of the caucus, resulting in more representative committees overall. According to Rohde’s
model, the primary agent whom legislative committees serve can change over time: “as partisan-based elections
increasingly elect members whose policy preferences are similar within and differentiated between the two parties,
these members choose to strengthen partisan organization within the [legislature]” (Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 546).
Under a less polarized system, therefore, committees should not be as beholden to the preferences of the majority
party and its leadership. The opposite is also true; more polarized parties produce committees that are more
responsive to the party leadership and the preferences of the majority party. Aldrich and Battista (2002) provide
evidence that the conditional party government model can explain committee organization in state legislatures.
Unfortunately, insufficient data on polarization in Virginia meant that I was unable to test conditional party
government theory in the General Assembly.
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citizens, serve for two-year terms, while senators represent approximately 200,000 citizens each
and serve four-year terms. Beyond differences in size, the unique rules of each chamber may
affect the way that they organize their respective committees. This section addresses key
differences in the chambers’ leadership structures, their committee systems, and their electoral
history.
Chamber Characteristics
Proceedings in the House are dominated by the Speaker of the House, who has the power
to make committee appointments, designate committee chairs, and assign bills to committees.
According to former Speaker William Howell, the Virginia House Speakership is generally
recognized as an unusually strong one, with considerably more power over legislative
proceedings than speakers in other state lower chambers. Howell referenced South Carolina and
Georgia as states where the Rules Committees, rather than House Speakers, determine committee
membership and bill assignment. In Virginia, the Speaker exercises both of these powers.
Virginia House Speakers may, as Howell did, choose to work with a “kitchen cabinet” of key
majority party members who provide advice on assignments. As the leader of the majority party,
Speakers may also seek to accommodate the requests of party members when possible. After
receiving this input, the Speaker has final say in all decisions, and challenges from other
legislators are infrequent. In the committee assignment process under Howell, members were
expected to take the initiative in making their preferences known to the Speaker. However, input
from the minority party and its leadership was rarely taken into account (W. Howell, personal
communication, November 9, 2020).
Since 1998, the rules of the House of Delegates have required that Speakers implement
proportional representation of the two major parties on every committee except for Rules. The
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change came about because of a partisan shift that allowed Republicans to share power with
Democrats in 1998 and 1999, after decades of unchallenged Democratic control. By pushing for
the adoption of a rule to require proportional representation on committees, newly empowered
Republicans hoped to end what they considered to be a history of unfair committee assignments
that overrepresented Democrats on key committees and packed Republicans onto powerless
committees like Interstate Cooperation (Christman 2018).
In contrast to the House, the Senate does not empower a single actor like the Speaker
with the power to make committee assignments. Rather, according to the rules of the Senate, the
majority caucus submits a nominations report for committee membership elections. This list of
nominations must then be agreed to by a majority of the Senate. During my time observing the
2020 session of the Virginia Senate, the majority leader, in consultation with committee chairs,
appeared to lead the process of deciding membership recommendations. Majority party
leadership engaged in dialogues with both majority and minority membership to craft a
nominations report that would achieve the necessary support from the full chamber. Although
Senate rules facilitate a more consultative assignment process than the House, they do not
require proportional representation on committees. In theory, this would allow a Senate majority
to overrepresent their own members on key committees.
In addition to differences in rules, the House and Senate differ in their traditions and
bipartisan relations. For example, multiple observers have described the Senate as more collegial
and inclined to bipartisanship than the House. Laura Vozzella, who covers Virginia politics for
the Washington Post, noted that “although they are politically divided, [the senators] actually all
like each other … Even after some very heated floor sessions, they all basically like and respect
each other” (L. Vozzella, personal communication, April 22, 2020). Senator Jennifer McClellan,
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who spent ten years in the House before her election to the Senate, attributed this difference to
the upper chamber’s smaller size and the longer tenure of its members. “When you’re forty, it’s
hard to be partisan and petty and take things personally,” she said, adding that with four-year
terms, senators do not have to spend all of their time thinking about reelection (J. McClellan,
personal communication, April 22, 2020). By contrast, the greater size and continual
campaigning of House members translates into greater competition and vitriol in relations
between delegates. These differences in atmosphere may produce differences in legislative
outcomes. Anecdotally, I have both personally observed and been told by Assembly staff and
elected officials that the collegiality between senators leads them to pass more moderate,
bipartisan legislation than their House counterparts.
Committee Systems in the House and Senate
Over the twenty-six year period covered by this study, the House has reorganized its
committees several times, while the Senate committee structure has remained constant. In 1998,
the House replaced the Nominations Committee with a committee on Science and Technology.
Four years later, the House consolidated four committees (Agriculture, Chesapeake and Its
Tributaries, Conservation and Natural Resources, and Mining and Mineral Resources) into one
(Agriculture, Chesapeake, and Natural Resources), while Corporations, Insurance and Banking,
and Labor and Commerce became Commerce and Labor. The virtually powerless Interstate
Cooperation Committee was done away with, as was the Claims Committee, taking the House
from twenty committees to fourteen. When Democrats took control of both chambers in 2020,
they did not amend the committee structure, although a couple of committees were renamed to
more accurately reflect their existing jurisdictions: the House Commerce and Labor Committee
was renamed Labor and Commerce, and House Science and Technology was renamed
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Communications, Technology and Innovation. Also in 2020, the Senate Courts of Justice
Committee was renamed Judiciary; and Senate Finance was renamed Finance and
Appropriations. Thus, as of 2020, the General Assembly had twenty-five total committees:
fourteen in the House and eleven in the Senate. A list of these committees can be seen in Table 1.
Unless otherwise specified by parentheticals in Table 1, the 2020 committee names will be used
to refer to committees in all sessions.

Table 1. General Assembly Committees in 2020
House Committees

Senate Committees

Agriculture, Chesapeake and Natural
Resources (Agriculture)

Agriculture, Conservation and Natural
Resources (Agriculture)

Appropriations

Commerce and Labor (Commerce)

Communications, Technology and Innovation
(Technology)

Education and Health

Counties, Cities, and Towns (Counties)

Finance and Appropriations (Finance)

Courts of Justice (Courts)

General Laws and Technology (General
Laws)

Education

Judiciary (Courts)

Finance

Local Government

General Laws

Privileges and Elections (P&E)

Health, Welfare and Institutions (Health)

Rehabilitation and Social Services
(Rehabilitation)

Labor and Commerce (Commerce)

Rules

Privileges and Elections (P&E)

Transportation

Public Safety
Rules
Transportation
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Prior to the 2002 reorganization of House committees, senators and delegates would each
serve on approximately four committees. Since 2002, senators usually still serve on four
committees, while delegates usually serve on three committees. Most Senate committees have
fifteen members, although Rules, Commerce, or Finance may have one or two more members, in
keeping with their relative prestige and power. By contrast, Local Government, P&E, and
Transportation may have fewer members; for instance, in the 2016 session all three of these
committees had just thirteen members. In the House, committees since 2002 have usually had
twenty-two members, with the exception of Rules, which has a membership closer to fifteen, and
Appropriations, which may have a membership above or below average. Before 2002,
committees varied much more widely in membership size.
Electoral History
Because of changes in Virginia’s partisan orientation between 1996 and 2020, control of
the two General Assembly chambers has gone back and forth over the years. After the end of
Democratic control with a 50-50 partisan split in 1998 and 1999, the House was a reliably
Republican institution until 2020, when Democrats gained a ten-seat majority. The tie in 1998
and 1999 resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the two major parties, with divided
control of committees. The Senate had a similar power-sharing agreement from 1996 to 2000.
While the Senate had two other instances of 20-20 splits in 2012 and 2014, in these cases the
balance of power was determined by the Lieutenant Governor, who serves as President of the
Senate, and is allowed to vote on legislation in the event of a tie. In 2012, while Democrats and
Republicans both held twenty seats, the Senate was controlled by Republicans under the
Republican Lieutenant Governor at the time, Bill Bolling. In 2014, when Ralph Northam became
Lieutenant Governor, party control in the Senate transferred to the Democrats. After the end of
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Democratic control in the Senate in 1996, Democrats held a majority of Senate seats only in
2008, 2010, and 2020.
Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical and legislature backgrounds previously described, I formulate
hypotheses that anticipate certain outcomes in committee makeup. These hypotheses are divided
into sections based on the specific theories that they address and the metrics used to assess
committee membership.
Informational Theory and Talent-Tapping
Under informational theory, committees are organized to produce legislation with
predictable outcomes that are in alignment with the preferences of the chamber majority. Ideally,
committees should achieve these ends at minimal cost to the chamber in terms of informationgathering. To that end, legislatures assign committee members who can reduce uncertainty about
policy outcomes within a given jurisdiction to the greatest degree, but at the least cost. Krehbiel
(1991) accounts for this tendency in his seminal work on informational theory, theorizing that
unrepresentative committees emerge because their members, despite being preference outliers
within the chamber, have the most to offer in terms of low-cost expertise and information
gathering. For example, a legislature may attempt to “tap the talents” of its members by
assigning legislators with professional experience in a certain field to a committee whose policy
jurisdiction overlaps with that field (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011). If informational theory
applies in the General Assembly, where part-time legislators engage in separate occupations
outside of their policymaking roles, then this sort of talent-tapping should be visible. Health care
professionals should be overrepresented on health-related committees, lawyers should be
overrepresented on judiciary-related committees, farmers should be overrepresented on
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agriculture-related committees, and so on. In this way, the chamber would obtain the most policy
expertise at the lowest cost of time and resources for information-gathering.
H1: If informational theory applies, then committees will be disproportionately
made up of legislators whose occupations align with the policy jurisdictions of the
committees.
Partisan Theory and Stacking
In addition to looking at legislators’ occupations, I look at their party affiliation to
determine the ratio of majority party members to minority party members in the full chamber and
in individual committees. Under partisan theory, majority party leadership should attempt to
prevent minority obstructionism in committee by creating an imbalance of representation that
favors the majority party, allowing committees to better represent majority party opinions.
Studies by Hedlund et al. (2009) and Ryan and McGrath (2019) both found evidence of majority
parties “stacking” committees with their own members. A higher majority-to-minority party
member (M:m) ratio in committees than in the full chamber would indicate the presence of
stacking in committees, and thereby provide evidence that partisan theory helps to explain
committee organization in the General Assembly.
H2: If partisan theory applies, then the ratio of seats held by the majority party
compared to the minority party will be greater in committee than in the full
chamber.
Additionally, according to Cox and McCubbins (1993), majority party leadership should
do the most stacking in committees that have a high likelihood of impacting the collective
electoral fortunes of the majority. The committees that legislators view as more important to
party image, referred to here as control committees, should have a greater degree of stacking than
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non-control committees. While studies of the U.S. Congress designate Finance, Appropriations,
and Rules as control committees, these designations do not translate well to the Virginia General
Assembly. William Howell, Speaker of the House of Delegates from 2003 to 2018, considers the
Committees on Appropriations, Commerce and Labor, and Courts of Justice to be the most
important committees in the House. According to Howell, the Committee on Rules, while
commonly viewed as an assignment for more senior and influential party members, does little to
impact the functioning or outcomes of the House (W. Howell, personal communication,
November 9, 2020). Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the House and Senate
Appropriations (Finance in the Senate), Commerce and Labor, and Courts of Justice committees
will be regarded as control committees.
H3: If partisan theory applies, then the ratio of seats held by the majority party
compared to the minority party will be greater in control committees than in noncontrol committees.
In addition to variation between committees, partisan theory predicts that stacking would
vary across sessions based on the size of the majority party. According to studies by Hedlund,
Coombs, and Martorano (2009) and McGrath and Ryan (2019), majority party stacking should
be greater in years with narrower majorities. In theory, less secure majorities should seek to
prevent minority party obstruction at the committee stage, as well as to ensure that committees
will not bring legislation to the floor that is likely to divide the majority party and result in a
losing vote (Anzia and Jackman 2013; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hedlund et al. 2009). To that
end, majority leadership will seek to tighten their control over committees by overrepresenting
their party through stacking.
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H4: If partisan theory applies, then majority overrepresentation on committees
will be greater when there is a smaller majority-to-minority ratio in the chamber
than when there is a greater majority-to-minority ratio.
For this section of the study, twenty-three total committees will be considered: eleven
Senate committees, eleven House committees whose jurisdictions have not appreciably changed
over time, and the House Commerce and Labor committee, for which Corporations is used as a
proxy before 2002. I consider Corporations to be a reasonable proxy for Commerce and Labor
because, as former Speaker Howell observed, Commerce and Labor derives the greater part of its
power from its ability to affect the workings of Virginia businesses (W. Howell, personal
communication, November 9, 2020). The success of these businesses can impact economic
growth—and thereby electoral outcomes—across the state. Well-endowed corporations may also
work to support members of the Commerce and Labor (or Corporations) committee in elections
in order to garner support on key legislation. Thus, the most “controlling” or significant work of
Commerce and Labor maps well onto the work formerly done by Corporations.
Informational Model, Partisan Model, and Ideology Scores
In addition to legislators’ occupations and party affiliation, scholars have relied on
ideology scores derived from roll call votes and questionnaires to test informational and partisan
theories. In order to determine the ideological preferences of Virginia legislators, I utilize data
from the American Legislatures project, which Shor and McCarty (2011) use to test spatial
models of state legislators’ voting patterns. Shor and McCarty derive individual-level ideology
scores for state legislators based on the legislators’ responses to Project Vote Smart’s National
Political Awareness Test (NPAT) and roll call votes. Scores for Virginia legislators since 1996
have ranged from -1.63 to 1.53, with positive scores indicating more conservative preferences
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and negative scores indicating more liberal preferences. A higher absolute score value indicates a
more extreme position. The 2020 update to the Shor-McCarty NPAT data sets shows scores for
General Assembly members in all twelve even-year sessions between 1996 and 2018.
According to informational theory, committees are organized to produce bills preferred
by the delegate in the chamber with median ideological preferences, so committee ideological
makeup should reflect that of the chamber (Krehbiel 1991). By contrast, partisan theory claims
that committees, especially control committees, should be stacked with loyal partisans who shift
the ideological balance of the committee in the majority party’s preferred direction. Therefore, if
informational theory is the model for committee organization in the General Assembly, the
absolute difference between the committees’ average ideology scores and the chamber medians
should be less than the absolute difference between the committee averages and the majority
party median. This outcome would indicate that committees produce legislation preferred by the
chamber median over the majority party median.
H5: If informational theory applies, then the median ideology scores of
committees will be closer to the median ideology score of the full chamber than to
the median scores of the majority party.
In the case of H5, if the partisan model guides committee organization, then the opposite
will be true. Majority party leadership will seek to ideologically stack committees, either by
overrepresenting the majority party or by assigning more loyal partisans to sit on committees
with narrower majorities. This results in an ideological stacking that shifts average committee
ideology scores away from the chamber median and towards the majority party median. Support
for H5 would indicate an informational model of committee organization, while a lack of support
would indicate a partisan model. Moreover, if the partisan model applies in the General
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Assembly, then majority leadership should also seek to achieve more ideological stacking—that
is, to assign more loyal partisans—to control committees than to non-control committees, to
ensure majority-supported outcomes in the most electorally significant policy areas.
H6: If partisan theory applies, then the median ideology scores of control
committees will be closer to the majority party median than non-control
committees.
Additionally, similar to H4’s test for greater overrepresentation of majority party
members on committees during sessions with narrower majorities, narrower majorities should
also lead majority leadership to seek tighter control over committee outcomes by assigning more
loyal partisans to committees and producing ideological stacking.
H7: If partisan theory applies, then the median committee ideology scores of
majority party delegations will be closer to the majority party median in years
with lesser majority-to-minority ratios in the full chamber than in years with a
greater majority-to-minority ratio.
Inter-Chamber Differences
For each of the foregoing hypotheses, I will be analyzing data from both the House and
the Senate. As I draw conclusions about the use of informational and partisan models for
understanding General Assembly committee function, I will also consider whether my results
indicate differences between the two chambers.
In considering whether the House or the Senate is more likely to follow the informational
model, one could make a case for either chamber. On the one hand, the House has historically
been less competitive than the Senate, in that it has wider majorities and changes control less
frequently. This would theoretically decrease the incentives for majorities to engage in more
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partisan stacking to ensure that they achieve key successes during their time in power.
Additionally, the House rule requiring proportional committee assignments leaves less latitude
for partisan stacking by House majorities than by Senate majorities. Both of these characteristics
could result in a more informational model in the House than in the Senate.
On the other hand, based on my experience in and around General Assembly offices at
the Pocahontas Building in Richmond, VA, as well as interviews with important actors in the
legislative process, the Senate is anecdotally considered to be a more collegial body than its
larger counterpart, as well as a chamber which values bipartisan cooperation. This non-polarizing
environment could work against the formation of partisan committees. Party leadership in the
Senate also does not have the unusually ingrained power possessed by the Speaker of the House
of Delegates, making party leadership’s control over committee outcomes more uncertain in the
upper chamber. Additionally, according to Virginia’s Legislative Information System, the Senate
continuously introduced a greater number of bills relative to its members than has the House
since at least 1996. Theoretically, this difference would indicate a greater value on informationgathering via committee organization in the Senate than in the House.
Taking into consideration the differences between the chambers in terms of electoral
competitiveness, rules, and bipartisanship, I anticipate that both chambers could feasibly engage
in more partisan or more informational forms of organization.
H8: The information model is as likely to explain organization of Senate
committees as House committees.
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Methods and Results
This section explains the method by which I tested my hypotheses, as well as the results
of those tests. The hypotheses are tested in the order they were presented, grouped into
subsections for occupation data, party affiliation, and ideology scores.
Testing the Informational Model: Occupation Data (H1)
I begin by testing my hypothesis that if informational theory applies in the General
Assembly, then committees will be disproportionately made up of legislators whose occupations
align with the policy jurisdictions of the committees (H1). My data for testing this hypothesis
comes from two sources. The first is the Legislative Information System (LIS) maintained by
Virginia’s Division of Legislative Automated Services. LIS provides extensive information on
committee membership, daily floor and committee proceedings, and bill histories for every
session of the General Assembly going back to 1994. Based on the information contained in LIS,
I assigned legislators a binary variable for committee membership in each committee of the
relevant chamber and session, with “1” representing committee membership and “0”
representing committee non-membership. My second source of data for this test was the Virginia
Public Access Project (VPAP), a nonpartisan not-for-profit organization which promotes
campaign finance transparency and provides access to information on Virginia politicians,
including the demographic, partisan, and occupational makeup of Virginia’s legislative
chambers. For the past eight regular sessions of the General Assembly, VPAP has classified
senators and delegates within a set of twelve occupation groups. This study focuses on even-year
sessions (that is, post-election sessions, 60-day sessions, or budget sessions), and presents
occupational data from four such sessions: 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020.
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For the House, I will examine the Agriculture, Commerce, Courts, Education, and Health
Committees. For the Senate, I will examine the Commerce, Education and Health, and Courts
Committees. I selected these committees because of their significance in terms of policy focus,
as well as their clear relationship to certain occupation classifiers listed by VPAP. Following the
model of Hamm, Hedlund, and Post (2011), I created a data set for each of the selected
committees in each of the selected sessions. Committee members were assigned a binary code
based on the relevance or irrelevance of their occupation field, with “1” representing a relevant
occupation field and “0” representing an irrelevant occupation field. The occupations assumed to
be “relevant” to each committee are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Committees and Relevant Occupation Fields

House

Committee

Occupation

Agriculture

Farmers/Agriculture

Commerce

Business People

Courts of Justice

Lawyers

Education

Educators

Health

Medical Professions

Senate Commerce

Business People

Courts

Lawyers

Education and Health

Educators; Medical Professions
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For each committee, I find the proportion of members in the full chamber with the
relevant occupation field and the proportion of committee members with the relevant occupation
field. I then calculate the hypothetical committee occupation proportion at which there is the
least absolute difference between the committee and chamber proportions without altering the
size of the committee. I then determine how many committee members with a relevant
occupation would need to be replaced by members with irrelevant occupations to achieve the
expected occupation proportion.
Take the 2016 House Courts Committee as an example. In 2016, a total of twenty-three
delegates were occupied in some aspect of the legal profession, resulting in a Courts-related
occupation proportion of .23 for the chamber. The Courts Committee has twenty-two members.
If five of these members represented Courts-related professions, then the committee occupation
proportion would be .227, which is the closest possible value to the chamber proportion of .23
without altering the size of the committee. The 2016 House Courts Committee had fifteen
members with relevant occupations, making the actual committee occupation proportion .682.
Ten of these specialized members would need to be replaced by nonspecialized members to
achieve the committee occupation proportion that is most representative of the chamber
occupation proportion. Thus House Courts overrepresents occupational specialists, illustrating a
strong preference for information based organization on this committee.
Table 3 displays the number of members with a relevant occupation that would need to
be replaced with nonspecialists to make their committees more representative of the chamber
occupation proportion. A positive value indicates that the profession in question is
overrepresented on the committee, supporting the informational model’s argument that
legislatures seek to “tap the talents” of members who are in relevant occupational fields. A
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negative value indicates the opposite: that the relevant occupational field is underrepresented on
the committee relative to what would be expected in a random assignment.
The data laid out in Table 3 show that H1 was almost universally true in both chambers.
Legislators with occupational experience in a certain field are almost always overrepresented on
committees that legislate on issues related to that field, suggesting that the General Assembly
does attempt to “tap the talents” of its members. However, the extent to which this
overrepresentation occurs varies between committees and by sessions. The Courts Committees of
both chambers are routinely stacked to a greater degree than any other committee. The effect is
particularly pronounced on House Courts, where as many as eleven more members with lawrelated professions will be on the Courts Committee than would be expected in a random
assignment. The Senate Commerce Committee, as well as the House committees on Agriculture,
Education, and Health, have overrepresented members with relevant occupations to different
degrees in different years. By contrast, the Senate Education committee has overrepresented
educators to the same degree for each of the four sessions studied. Thus, the value of a relevant
occupational background in Education has remained constant over time, while its value in other
committees has changed from session to session.
The only exception to the general pattern of positive values is the House Commerce
Committee, which was only overrepresented by Business People in the 2020 session. Before that,
the proportion of Commerce Committee members who were Business People was equal to or
less than the proportion of all delegates employed in that field. Thus, the House Commerce and
Labor Committee does not appear to be guided by informational theory, because delegates with
relevant occupational backgrounds are not disproportionately selected to serve on this
committee. On the other hand, the overrepresentation of lawyers in Senate and House Courts
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Table 3. Difference Between Chamber Occupation Proportions and Committee
Occupation Proportions

House

Senate

Committee

2014

2016

2018

2020

Agriculture

4

4

3

1

Commerce/Labor

0

-1

-1

1

Courts

11

10

9

11

Education

1

1

3

1

Health

4

4

2

4

Commerce/Labor

0

2

1

1

Courts

6

5

5

6

Education

2

2

2

2

suggests that the Courts Committees operate under an informational model, where legislators
with occupational backgrounds in the practice of law are selected to serve on the committee and
employ their expertise in evaluating legislation.
Testing the Partisan Model: Party Affiliation Ratios (H2-4)
My next set of hypotheses looks for evidence of stacking, or majority party
overrepresentation on committees. If partisan theory applies, then H2 predicts that the ratio of
seats held by the majority party compared to the minority party will be greater in committee than
in the full chamber; H3 predicts that the ratio of seats held by the majority party compared to the
minority party will be greater in control committees than in non-control committees; and H4
predicts that majority overrepresentation will be greater in years with narrower majorities. To
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test these hypotheses, I compare the majority-to-minority (M:m) ratios of the full chamber and
the individual committees.
I use a similar method to assess the difference between chamber and committee M:m
ratios as I used to compare chamber and committee occupation ratios. However, rather than
determine the projected committee M:m ratio at which there would be the least absolute
difference between the chamber and committee ratios, I found the least committee M:m ratio at
which the committee ratio would be greater than or equal to the chamber ratio. This modification
is based on the rules of the House of Delegates, which since 1998 have required proportional
representation on committees. If it is impossible to achieve exact equality in chamber and
committee ratios, then committee assignments may err on the side of overrepresenting the
majority party. While the Senate has no such rule, applying this standard to both chambers will
allow for a more exact comparison.
To better understand this method of analysis, consider a Senate chamber with an M:m
ratio of 22:18 (1.22). A fifteen-member committee created by this chamber has an M:m ratio of
10:5 (2.00). A committee M:m ratio of 8:7 (1.14) would produce the least absolute difference
between committee and chamber M:m ratios, but would be less than the chamber ratio. The
expected committee M:m ratio is therefore 9:6 (1.50), the least possible ratio at which the
committee M:m ratio could remain greater than or equal to the chamber ratio. In this case, one
committee member would need to change from majority to minority to bring the committee M:m
from the actual ratio (10:5) to the expected ratio (9:6). A positive difference between the actual
and expected ratio indicates that stacking has occurred; the number of committee members who
would need to change indicates the extent to which it has occurred. This allows me to test for the
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presence of stacking, and therefore to determine whether the majority party presses its advantage
in committees, as predicted by the partisan theory.
Figures 1 and 2 provide results for H2 in the House, with Figure 1 displaying how many
committees were stacked per session and Figure 2 displaying how often each of the twelve
committees was stacked out of the fourteen sessions being considered. As Figure 1 shows,
stacking occurred frequently in the House prior to 1998, when an amendment to the rules
required proportional representation on all committees except for Rules. In accordance with Rule
16(a), comparatively few committees have been stacked following the end of power-sharing in
2000.2 The fact that the House adopted a rule requiring proportional party representation on its

Number of Committees Stacked

Figure 1. Number of House Committees Stacked by Session,
1994-2020
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

8

7

3
2

2
1

1
0

1994 1996 1998* 2000 2002

0

2004 2006 2008

0
2010 2012

1

1

0
2014

2016 2018

2020

■ Democratic Control ■ Republican Control
*power-sharing agreement, no majority

2

Rule 16(a) reads as follows: “Except for the Committee on Rules, membership on all standing committees and
subcommittees will be contingent upon membership or nonmembership in the majority party caucus. The
apportionment of members will be according to the same ratio of members in the House of Delegates who are
members or nonmembers of the majority party caucus. If such ratio would represent a fractional number of the
committee or subcommittee membership assigned to the majority party caucus, then the number of majority party
caucus members will be the next highest whole number of committee or subcommittee members. For the purposes
of this rule only, members who do not caucus with the majority party caucus or the largest minority party caucus
will be deemed part of the majority party caucus.”
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committees, as well as the fact that this rule has largely been adhered to since its adoption,
suggests that the House has attempted to create an informational committee system that serves
the full chamber rather than the majority party. Prior to the adoption of this rule, a more partisan
pattern of majority stacking guided committee assignments. Additionally, disproportionate
representation on Rules is allowed under Rule 16(a), and House majorities have continued to
exercise stacking on that committee. The Rules Committee therefore exhibits more partisan
characteristics than other committees in the post-1998 period, having been stacked more often
than any other committee.
There have been some violations of Rule 16(a) since 1998, as seen in 2000, 2002, and
2010.3 Majority parties have also frequently done as much as possible to overrepresent their
party while remaining in the bounds of the proportionality rule. For example, in 2008, a unique
situation allowed Republicans to achieve a 1.44 M:m ratio on many committees despite a 1:2
M:m ratio in the chamber. An M:m ratio of 1.2 (12:10) could have been achieved in the 22person committees had Republicans not made use of an additional rule clarifying that
independents not caucusing with either party are counted as part of the majority for purposes of
committee proportionality. Under this rule, independent Delegate Watkins Abbitt, Jr., was
counted as part of the majority caucus, creating a chamber ratio of 1.22 and allowing
Republicans to overrepresent themselves on committees. Additionally, both Democratic and
Republican majorities have made use of the stipulation that committee assignments can err on
the side of overrepresenting the majority party, rather than requiring that ratios be as close as

3

By cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, we can determine which non-Rules
committees were stacked in the post-1998 sessions. In 2000, the non-Rules stacked committee was Courts. In 2002,
Rules was not stacked, but Commerce, Transportation, and General Laws were. In 2010, Rules was not stacked, but
Commerce and Transportation were. All other instances of stacking post-1998 (including 2000, 2004, 2016, 2018,
and 2020) occurred in the Rules committee, as permitted by Rule 16(a) of the House of Delegates.

COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY

30

possible. For example, in 2020, the closest possible committee M:m ratio to the 1.22 chamber
M:m ratio would have been 1.2 for a 22-person committee; however, the Democratic majority
established 1.44 M:m ratios on most committees. Thus, while the House rules attempt to
establish an informational model for committee membership, committee assignments since 1998
suggest that House Speakers still seek to overrepresent their party on committees by exploiting
certain provisions in Rule 16(a).
While information theory appears to be more applicable in the House with regards to
overall frequency of stacking, there is still some evidence for partisan theory in terms of which
committees are most frequently stacked. In keeping with H3, which predicts a greater incidence
of stacking on control committees than non-control committees within a partisan model, Figure 2
shows that Commerce is the most frequently stacked committee aside from Rules. Commerce
was stacked four times between 1994 and 2000, indicating that it was stacked at least twice after

Figure 2. Frequency of Stacking in House Committees,
1994-2020
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the proportionality requirement was established in 1998.4 Courts was also stacked at least once
after the establishment of this requirement, tied with the non-control General Laws committee
for overall frequency of stacking.5 The relatively high degree of stacking on Commerce and
Courts, both designated as control committees, suggests that partisan theory is partially true in
the House, despite the proportional representation rule. Later in this section, examining the
degree of stacking on control and non-control committees will provide more insight into
informational and/or partisan arrangements prior to 1998, when the majority of House stacking
occurred.
Figures 3 and 4 show stacking by session and by committee for the Senate, with fourteen
sessions and eleven committees being considered. Stacking occurs much more frequently in this
chamber than in the House, likely because the Senate has no proportional representation rule.
Except for 1996 and 1998, when a power-sharing agreement meant that no party had a majority
of seats, at least three Senate committees have been stacked every year since 1994. This includes
2012 and 2014, when the Senate had an even split of twenty Democrats and twenty Republicans.
Democratic senators complained when Republicans used Lieutenant Governor Bill Bolling’s tie
breaking vote to stack committees in 2012; however, Democrats also engaged in stacking when
the election of Ralph Northam as Lieutenant Governor gave Democrats an edge in the Senate
(Gorman 2014). In fact, while Republicans stacked three committees with a 21-20 advantage in
the chamber in 2012, Democrats stacked five committees while holding the same margin in
2014. When Democrats returned to power in 2020, they once again engaged in more stacking
than the previous Republican majority, stacking seven committees to Republicans’ three. While

4

Cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, shows us that Commerce was stacked in 1994,
1996, 2002, and 2010.
5
Cross-referencing with Table 4, which appears later in this section, shows us that Courts was stacked in 1994,
1996, and 2000. General Laws was stacked in 1994, 1996, and 2002.
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Numberof Committees Stacked

Figure 3. Number of Senate Committees Stacked by
Session, 1994-2020
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Democrats appear to have stacked more frequently, both committees have engaged in stacking
when in the majority. In comparison to the House, Senate committee organization follows a more
partisan model.
As Figure 4 shows, Senate committees differ in how often they are stacked,
demonstrating that application of the partisan model varies by committee. Three Senate
committees—Agriculture, Local Government, and Rehabilitation—were never stacked.
Meanwhile, the most frequently stacked committees—Commerce, Finance, and Rules—were
stacked nine, ten, and twelve times, respectively. In accordance with H3’s prediction that greater
stacking would occur on control committees, two of the three most frequently stacked
committees were control committees. The last control committee, Courts, was tied for fourth
most frequently stacked committee, along with Education and P&E. Viewed in conjunction with
the findings under H1 that Courts disproportionately represents occupational experts (i.e.,
lawyers), the finding that Courts was not stacked as often as other control committees provides
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Figure 4. Frequency of Stacking in Senate Committees,
1994-2020
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further evidence that Senate Courts subscribes to an informational model, rather than to a
partisan model. Overall, however, the lack of a proportionality rule in the Senate and the
frequency with which majority parties stack committees, especially control committees,
demonstrates that most Senate committees have a more partisan organization than their House
counterparts.
Tables 4 and 5 show results on the degree to which stacking occurs. The values in these
tables represent the number of majority party members on a committee who would need to be
replaced by minority party members to achieve a committee M:m ratio representative of the full
chamber. With regards to H2 and the prediction that committees would overrepresent majority
parties relative to the chamber, Table 4 shows that stacking in the post-1998 House is rare, and
the degree of stacking is usually quite small. Actual committee ratios after 1998 were rarely
more than one member away from the expected ratio, if they differed at all. By contrast, prior to
1998, these data indicate that the House used to operate by a much more partisan model. A
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majority of committees were stacked in 1994 and 1996, often by factors greater than one.
Control committees were stacked by factors of three or more, suggesting prioritization of
majority control over important committees. While stacking has been significantly reduced since
1998, the recent upward trend in stacking on the Rules committee suggests that the House may
be returning to a more partisan model while remaining within the bounds of Rule 16(a).

Table 4. Degree of Stacking in the House
values represent the number of majority party committee members who would need to be replaced by minority
party members to achieve the expected M:m committee ratio

‘94 ‘96 ‘98 ‘00 ‘02 ‘04 ‘06 ‘08 ‘10 ‘12 ‘14 ‘16 ‘18 ‘20
Appropriations*

4

5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Commerce*

3

3

-

1

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

Courts*

3

3

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Rules

2

2

1

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

1

2

3

Transportation

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

Counties

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Education

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Finance

2

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

General Laws

1

1

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Health

1

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

P&E

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Public Safety

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

* control committee
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Table 5. Degree of Stacking in the Senate
values represent the number of majority party committee members who would need to be replaced by minority
party members to achieve the expected M:m committee ratio

‘94 ‘96 ‘98 ‘00 ‘02 ‘04 ‘06 ‘08

‘10 ‘12 ‘14 ‘16

‘18 ‘20

Commerce*

-1

1

1

2

2

-

-

1

1

3

3

4

Courts*

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-

2

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

-

-

1

2

2

2

2

4

4

2

3

4

3

4

3

4

4

4

1

1

1

1

-

-1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-1

-

-1

-

-

-

-

-

-1

-1

2

1

-

1

-

-

1

P
O
W
E
R
S
H
A
R
I
N
G

Finance*

3

Rules

3

Transportation

-1

Agriculture

-1

Education

1

GenLaws

-1

-

-

1

-

-

-1

-

-

-

-

1

Local
Government

-1

-

-

-1

-2

-1

-

-1

-1

-

-

-

P&E

-

1

1

-

-1

1

1

-

-

-

-

1

Rehab

-1

-1

-

-1

-1

-

-1

-

-1

-

-

-

*control committee

Table 5 shows that, in addition to stacking more often than the House, the Senate also
stacks to a greater degree. Senate committees were more frequently stacked by a factor greater
than one as compared to their House counterparts, excluding the pre-1998 House sessions.
Senate majorities have also occasionally undersold their advantage on particular committees,
creating situations in which the actual committee ratio is less than the expected ratio. Since a
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limited number of majority party members must be distributed among committee seats, and all
members of the major parties must have a committee seat, it makes sense that a greater degree of
stacking on some committees would necessitate that other committees have fewer majority party
members than expected. Local Government and Rehabilitation have both been frequent victims
of this phenomenon, which maintains majority party control of the committee but narrows the
margin of control from what would be considered an equitable ratio. By contrast, Rules is always
stacked to a greater degree than any other committee. The control committees also have
relatively high degrees of stacking relative to other committees, and especially so in recent years,
indicating a tendency towards partisan organization that has become stronger in the past few
sessions.
The exceptionality of the Rules Committee in these data merits some discussion. While
the House Rules Committee is the only committee exempted from the proportionality
requirement, there is not a similar structural explanation for the fact that the Senate Rules
Committee is stacked more often and stacked to a much greater degree than any other Senate
committee. I propose two possible explanations for this trend. The first is that the majority party
prefers to give the prestige posts on Rules to its own members, thereby allowing leadership to
either reward loyal partisans or curry the favor of more reluctant partisans. Alternatively, the
Rules Committees may have more sway in the Senate than Howell implied it to have in the
House. Even if the bills and resolutions considered by the Rules Committee have little direct
impact on the electorate, Senate leadership may view Rules as a key enabler of the majority
party’s ability to enact its agenda.
Next, I test my hypothesis that narrower majorities in the full chamber encourage greater
stacking in committees. For this analysis, I selected three sessions for the House (2012, 2014,
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and 2018) and three sessions for the Senate (2004, 2016, and 2018). In the House, I compare two
sessions when Republicans had a greater than 2:1 majority (2012 and 2014) with a session when
the party had a narrow two-seat majority (2018). In 2012 and 2014, no stacking occurred, even
on the Rules committee where disproportionate representation is permitted. In 2018, however,
Rules was stacked by a factor of two, suggesting that the Republican majority was attempting to
assert their advantage in this committee.
In the Senate, I compare a session with an M:m ratio of 1.50 (2004) to two sessions with
a ratio of 1.04 (2016 and 2018). In 2004, the Republican majority stacked five committees:
Commerce and Rules by a factor of two; Finance, General Laws and Transportation by a factor
of one. In 2016 and 2018, navigating just a two-seat majority, the Republicans stacked fewer
committees, but to a greater degree: Rules by a factor of four, Commerce by a factor of three,
Finance by a factor of two, and Courts by a factor of one. Republicans in 2018 thus appeared to
prioritize stacking of control committees. The evidence suggests that in both chambers, when
majorities become narrower, the majority party engages on a greater degree of stacking to ensure
control of key committees.
In summary, I find evidence of stacking in the Virginia General Assembly, but much
more so in the Senate than in the House. Stacking is also leveraged more frequently on control
committees than non-control committees. Majority overrepresentation becomes more
pronounced in situations with a narrower majority in the full chamber.
Testing the Theories: Ideology Scores (H5-7)
Having analyzed partisan theory on the basis of party identification, I next turn to
ideology scores to test further hypotheses for the informational and partisan theories. H5 predicts
that if informational theory applies in the General Assembly, then the median ideology scores of
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committees will be closer to the median ideology score of the full chamber than to the median
scores of the majority (H5). If partisan theory applies, then the opposite will be true. To test this
theory, I used Shor and McCarty’s NPAT scores for Virginia legislators to calculate median
NPAT scores for the chamber, for the two major parties, and for a selection of committees. I
chose to focus on control committees, with Transportation serving as a comparison non-control
committee.6 I place these different medians in relation to one another for each of the twelve
sessions for which I had data. This allows me to compare the median NPAT scores of a
committee with the chamber median, with the majority and majority party medians, and with the
medians of other committees. Analyzing the data this way also allows me to test my hypothesis
that, if partisan theory applies in the General Assembly, then the median ideology scores of
control committees will be closer to the majority party median than non-control committees
(H6).
Figure 5 shows median committee NPAT scores for the House between 1996 and 2018 as
compared to the chamber and party median scores.7 Overall, the data supports H5; most
committees during this period had median scores closer to the median of the full chamber than to
that of the majority party. In the majority of committees, median ideology scores fell somewhere
between the chamber and majority medians, although several committee medians actually fell
between the medians of the chamber and the minority party. H5 was not universally true within
this sample: a few committees had median scores closer to the majority party median than to the
chamber median, and the median score of the 2010 Rules committee fell beyond the majority

6

I selected Transportation as the non-control committee because, according to former Speaker Howell, while most
committees deal with some important legislation or policy areas, Transportation is generally viewed as an
unimportant committee to the extent that it does not deal with legislation that could substantially impact the electoral
fortunes of the majority party (W. Howell, personal communication, November 9, 2020).
7
Further information about the data seen in Tables 5 and 6 can be found in Appendix A.
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party median. Overall, however, the fact that committee medians tend to reflect the chamber
median more closely than the majority party median supports informational theory as a predictor
for House committee organization.
In terms of the differences between control and non-control committees, the median
NPAT scores of Courts and Commerce have consistently been among the closest, if not the
closest to the majority party median as compared to other committees. This corroborates the
expectations of partisan theory, which anticipates that control committees will be more reflective
of majority party interests than the interests of the chamber as a whole. Appropriations, despite
being a control committee, did not display this trend. It usually fell close to the chamber median,
or even between the chamber and majority party median. Rules has varied between more
informational and more partisan median scores over the years, making it difficult to tell which
model more effectively predicts its organization. Transportation is similarly difficult to predict,
although it appears to be slightly more informational than Rules because its median scores are
closer to the chamber median than to the majority median. Overall, it appears that H6’s partisan
model applies to some extent in the House, but predicts the activity of some control
committees—specifically, Commerce and Courts—more so than others.
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Figure 5. House Committee Median NPAT Scores Compared to
Chamber and Party Medians, 1996-2018
1.00

0.79

0.765
0.75

0.725

0.7
0.645

0.705

0.64

0.7

0.67

0.66

0.60
0.52

0.50

0.52

0.7

0.60

0.60

0.52
0.48

0.45

0.26

0.25
0.21

0.00

-0.16
-0.25

-0.50

-0.75
-0.76

-0.77
-0.85

-0.84

-0.84

-0.84

-0.85
-0.91

-1.00

-0.97
-1.01

1996 1998* 2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

-1.03

2018

-1.25

Chamber Median

Appropriations

Commerce

Courts

Rules

bolded values represent the Republican median
italicized values represent the Democratic median
underlined values represent the majority party median
* power-sharing agreement, no majority

Transportation

COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY

41

Figure 6 shows chamber, majority party, and committee medians for the Senate. Median
committee scores in the Senate are much more spread out than in the House, but mostly remain
in between the chamber and majority medians. There are fewer instances of committee medians
falling between the chamber and minority party medians, and more instances of committee
medians being closer to the majority party median than to the chamber medians. Thus, although
there is evidence for both informational and partisan patterns in Senate committees, the Senate
appears to have a more partisan organizational bent than the House in terms of ideological
composition. The Senate Rules Committee in particular is much more partisan than its House
counterpart. Between 2000 and 2014, the median score for Rules was not only consistently closer
to the majority party median than to the chamber median, but also closer to the majority party
median than any other committee. Although the median scores of control committees have varied
in terms of relative distance from the chamber and majority medians, Commerce and Courts
have been consistently closer to the majority median than to the chamber median since 2012,
confirming the expectations of partisan theory under H6. By comparison, the Finance and
Transportation Committees medians tend to be relatively closer to the chamber median than
other committees. This mirrors the pattern followed by committees in the House: Commerce and
Courts have a more partisan ideological makeup, while Finance and Transportation exhibit more
informational characteristics. These committee-specific findings are interesting in light of what
has been learned from previous analyses in this study. For example, the partisan trend seen in the
ideology scores of House and Senate Courts Committees conflicts with these committees’
relatively low incidence of stacking in comparison to other control committees, as well as their
informational “talent-tapping” model. Moreover, the Senate Finance Committee had less partisan
ideology scores than might have been expected, given how often it has been stacked.
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Figure 6. Senate Committee Median NPAT Scores Compared to
Chamber and Party Medians, 1996-2018
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My final hypothesis related to ideology scores predicts that, if partisan theory applies in
the General Assembly, then the median committee ideology scores of majority party delegations
will be closer to the majority party median in years with lesser majority-to-minority ratios in the
full chamber than in years with a greater majority-to-minority ratio (H7). To assess H7, I look
for a correlation between narrower margins in the full chamber and a smaller difference between
majority party medians and committee medians. In completing this test, I use data from the same
twenty-three committees used to test H2-4: twelve House committees and eleven Senate
committees whose jurisdictions have largely remained the same since 1996. I find the absolute
difference between the median ideology scores of the majority party and majority committee
delegations for all sessions. I then determine the correlation coefficient between this absolute
difference and the chamber ratio, looking for a correlation between smaller majorities and a
smaller distance between the majority and committee delegation medians. The House correlation
coefficient for the period 1996-2018 was -0.16738, and the Senate correlation coefficient was
-0.08793. Both of these values indicate a low degree of correlation between larger chamber
majorities and smaller distances between majority and committee delegation medians, thus
contradicting the expectations of H7 and of partisan theory in both chambers.
Results in Review and Inter-Chamber Comparison
My final hypothesis anticipated that the informational theory was equally likely to
explain committee organization in the Senate, purportedly the more “bipartisan” of the two
General Assembly chambers, as in the House, which established a rule against partisan stacking
(H8). Reviewing the results for both chambers contradicts that expectation. Although both
chambers showed evidence of “talent-tapping” in terms of overrepresenting members with
certain occupations on committees with relevant jurisdictions, when it came to stacking, the
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House’s proportional representation rule limited Speakers’ ability to stack committees with
members of the majority party. The Senate, on the other hand, continued to frequently engage in
partisan stacking. Furthermore, the most stacking in the Senate took place on the control
committees, as partisan theory would predict. Finally, an analysis of ideology scores showed
that, compared to the House, Senate committees were more ideologically similar to the majority
party median than to the chamber median. Overall, the data showed that the House had a more
informational organization model than the Senate.
From this result, it appears that chamber rules have greater bearing on committee
organization than House or Senate culture. Partisan theory provides further explanation for this
outcome. The narrower majorities in the Senate, where the margin of control has never surpassed
single digits, may encourage more stacking and ideological bias on committees as majority
parties seek to consolidate their weaker grip on power. Further study on inter-chamber
differences in the General Assembly could help to clarify this question.
Conclusion
Through an in-depth look at the Virginia General Assembly, my research shows that the
applicability of informational and partisan theories can vary, not just between different
legislatures, but within a single legislature. I found that committee organization in the General
Assembly reflects both informational and partisan theory, with stronger evidence for partisan
theory in the Senate. Both chambers engaged in “talent-tapping” by assigning members with
occupation experience in certain fields to committees with relevant policy jurisdictions. The
House attempted to limit the influence of a partisan model by adopting a proportionality
requirement for committee assignments in 1998, which significantly decreased the frequency and
degree of stacking on all committees except for the Rules Committee. The Senate, anecdotally
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considered to be the more bipartisan of the two chambers, has conversely engaged in more
partisan displays of stacking, both in terms of number of committees stacked and degree of
stacking. The Senate also tended to create committees with median ideology scores closer to
those of the majority party than to the chamber median, in contrast to the House.
The comparison of Virginia House and Virginia Senate, as well as intra-chamber
comparisons over time, show the influence of internally-imposed rules on committee
organization. After implementing the proportional representation requirement in 1998, the House
witnessed a significant decrease in stacking. The Senate, which never imposed a similar rule,
continued to stack more often and to a more significant degree than the lower chamber. Possibly
because of its stacking, the Senate also had more partisan-leaning median committee ideology
scores than the House. Contrary to my expectation, chamber rules had a greater impact on
committee organization than the potentially greater informational needs or bipartisan relations in
the upper chamber.
Inter-committee differences in the General Assembly are as significant as inter-chamber
differences. Control committees generally tended to show more partisan characteristics than noncontrol committees, as predicted by partisan theory. The Commerce Committees in particular
showed strong partisan characteristics in terms of frequent stacking and comparatively partisan
ideological biases, while simultaneously showing little evidence of an informational “talenttapping” model. By contrast, the Senate Finance Committee was frequently stacked but was
usually closer to the chamber median than to the majority party median, thus demonstrating both
informational and partisan characteristics. The House Appropriations Committee was not
frequently stacked and had median ideology scores relatively closer to the chamber median than
the majority party median. Finally, both informational and partisan theory applied to the House
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and Senate Courts Committees. On the informational side, these committees included
disproportionately high ratios of information specialists, and Senate Courts was stacked more
rarely than other Senate control committees. On the partisan side, both committees had relatively
biased median ideology scores.
Future research on General Assembly committees might expand on this study’s analysis
of the differences between committees. The control/non-control distinction paints with a broad
brush, ignoring potential gradations in the importance of non-control committees. For example,
the Senate Education and Health Committee may show more partisan characteristics than
Transportation or Agriculture. Additionally, Rules appeared to be a strong example of partisan
organization in both chambers, although the partisan orientation of its median ideology scores
has varied over time. From a partisan theory perspective, former Speaker Howell’s opinion that
Rules should not be considered a control committee may need reevaluation.
In addition to inter-chamber and inter-committee differences, a return to this line of
research might consider yet another line of comparison: inter-party. With the ideology scores
available, I had access to very few years with Democratic majorities or majorities comparable to
Republican majorities. If the two chambers continue to hold Democratic majorities in future
sessions, new data could allow for better comparison between how the two parties organize
committees when in power.
As the General Assembly continues to change, observers may be able to watch the
evolution of its committee system in real time. Beyond Virginia, more dedicated case studies of
committee systems in America’s statehouses would go a long way towards clarifying the
interaction between informational and partisan models across the divides of chamber, electoral
competitiveness, and control/non-control committee.
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Appendix A
Tables 6 and 7 provide more precise data regarding the relationship between committee
medians, chamber medians, and majority party medians as shown in Figures 5 and 6. By using
Mf to represent the full chamber median, Mm to represent the majority party median, and Mc to
represent the committee median, the tables in Appendix A show the difference between the
absolute difference of the majority and committee medians and the absolute difference of the
chamber and committee medians:
|(Mm - Mc)| - |(Mf - Mc)|
If the absolute difference between majority and committee median is less than the absolute
difference between chamber and committee median, (|(Mm - Mc)| < |(Mf - Mc)|), then the value
shown in Table 6 or 7 will be positive. This indicates a more informational model and confirms
H5: the median ideology scores of committee will be closer to the median ideology score of the
full chamber than to the median scores of the majority. If the absolute difference between
majority and committee median is greater than the absolute difference between chamber and
committee median, (|(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)|), then the value shown in Table 6 or 7 will be
negative. This indicates that committees are more partisan and provides evidence against H5. A
higher positive value indicates a more informational model, while a lower negative number
indicates a more partisan model.
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Table 6. |(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)| in the House, 1996-2018

1996

Appropriations

Commerce

Courts

Rules

Transportation

0.22

-0.23

-0.04

0.12

0.61

1998

(power-sharing agreement, no majority)

2000

0.43

0.18

-0.02

0.43

-0.15

2002

0.19

0.19

-0.10

0.19

0.11

2004

0.25

0.25

0.15

0.11

0.06

2006

0.25

0.25

0.09

0.16

0.15

2008

0.26

0.24

-0.06

0.05

0.19

2010

0.15

0.04

0.05

-0.15

0.15

2012

0.08

0.01

0.06

-0.02

0.08

2014

0.10

0.04

0.09

0.06

0.10

2016

0.11

0.01

-0.03

0.05

0.11

2018

0.04

-0.13

-0.33

-0.08

-0.04
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Table 7. |(Mm - Mc)| > |(Mf - Mc)| in the Senate, 1996-2018
Commerce

Courts

Finance

Rules

Transportation

1996
(power-sharing agreement, no majority)
1998
2000

0.20

0.23

0.18

-0.18

0.05

2002

0.13

0.24

0.18

-0.18

0.03

2004

-0.01

0.17

0.17

-0.02

0.08

2006

-0.03

0.24

0.24

-0.03

0.06

2008

0.50

0.15

0.45

-0.50

0.39

2010

0.42

-0.24

0.37

-0.42

0.42

2012

-0.13

-0.09

-0.09

-0.29

0.14

2014

-0.01

-0.69

-0.69

-0.86

0.24

2016

-0.25

-0.25

0.25

-0.19

0.10

2018

-0.25

-0.25

0.22

-0.19

0.10

